We investigate the implications of balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction in the context of sequencing problems. Balanced consistency requires that the effect on the payoff from the departure of one agent to another agent should be equal between any two agents. On the other hand, balanced cost reduction requires that if one agent leaves a problem, then the total payoffs of the remaining agents should be affected by the amount previously assigned to the leaving agent. We show that the minimal transfer rule is the only rule satisfying efficiency and Pareto indifference together with either one of our two main axioms, balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction.
Introduction
Consider a group of agents who must be served in a facility. The facility can handle only one agent at a time and agents incur waiting costs. We assume that an agent's waiting cost is constant per unit of time, but that agents differ in the unit waiting cost and the amount of service time. Efficiency requires to minimize the total costs incurred by the agents. On the other hand, fairness requires that agents served earlier should give compensations to agents served later. We are interested in finding the order in which to serve agents and the (positive or negative) monetary compensations they should receive. Each agent's utility is equal to his monetary compensation minus his total waiting cost. This sequencing problem has been studied extensively in the recent literature: from the incentive viewpoint (Dolan 1978; Suijs 1996; Mitra 2001 Mitra , 2002 and from the normative viewpoint (Maniquet 2003; Chun 2011 Chun , 2006a Mishra and Rangarajan 2007; Moulin 2007) . Two well-known subclasses of sequencing problems are (i) a queueing problem in which all agents are assumed to need the same amount of service time but they differ in their unit waiting cost, and (ii) a scheduling problem in which all agents are assumed to have the same unit waiting cost but need (possibly) different amount of service times.
This article focuses on the normative approach. Two solutions or rules that have played important roles in the normative approach are the minimal and the maximal transfer rules. As shown in Maniquet (2003) and Chun (2006a) for queueing problems, and their generalization to sequencing problems by Chun (2011) , these two rules can be obtained by applying the Shapley value (Shapley 1953 ) to corresponding cooperative games in which the worth of a coalition is appropriately defined from the sequencing problem. For the minimal transfer rule, the worth of a coalition is defined to be the minimum waiting cost incurred by its members under the assumption that they are served before the non-coalitional members. For the maximal transfer rule, it is defined to be the minimum waiting cost incurred by its members under the assumption that they are served after the non-coalitional members. 1 In this article, we investigate how the minimal and the maximal transfer rules respond to changes in the set of agents. Our first main axiom is balanced consistency, which requires that the effect on the payoff from the departure of one agent to another agent should be equal between any two agents. We show that the minimal transfer rule is the only rule satisfying efficiency, Pareto indifference, and balanced consistency. On the other hand, the maximal transfer rule can be characterized by an alternative formulation of balanced consistency under constant completion time: upon the departure of an agent, all of his predecessors are assumed to move back by one position to keep the completion time constant. Under this alternative formulation, the maximal transfer rule becomes the only rule satisfying efficiency, Pareto indifference, and balanced consistency under constant completion time.
Our second main axiom is balanced cost reduction, which requires that if one agent leaves a problem, then the total payoffs of the remaining agents should be affected by the amount previously assigned to the leaving agent. Once again, the minimal transfer rule is the only rule satisfying efficiency, Pareto indifference, and balanced cost reduction.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some preliminaries and introduces rules. Section 3 explores the implications of balanced consistency and presents our first characterization of the minimal transfer rule. Section 4 explores the implications of balanced cost reduction and presents our second characterization of the minimal transfer rule. Concluding remarks follow in Sect. 5.
Preliminaries
Let I ≡ {1, 2, . . .} be a (finite or infinite) universe of "potential" agents, and N the family of non-empty subsets of I. Each agent i ∈ I is characterized by his service time, r i > 0, and his unit waiting cost, θ i ≥ 0. A sequencing problem is defined as a list (N , r, θ) where N ∈ N is the set of agents, r = (r i ) i∈N ∈ IR N ++ is the vector of service times, and θ = (θ i ) i∈N ∈ IR N + is the vector of unit waiting costs. Let S N be the class of all sequencing problems for N and S = N ∈N S N . Two subclasses of sequencing problems introduced earlier are a queueing problem, where for each i, j ∈ I, r i = r j , and a scheduling problem, where for each i, j ∈ I,
where for each i ∈ N , σ i denotes agent i's position in the queue and t i the monetary transfer to him. Let P i (σ ) = { j ∈ N | σ j < σ i } be the set of agents preceding agent i in σ , and F i (σ ) = { j ∈ N | σ j > σ i } the set of agents following him. The agent who is served first incurs no waiting cost. The waiting cost of agent i ∈ N in the queue σ is j∈P i (σ ) r j θ i . We assume that each agent i ∈ N has a quasi-linear utility function, so that his utility from consuming the bundle (σ, t) is given by u i (σ, t) = t i − j∈P i (σ ) r j θ i , where t i is the transfer of agent i and − j∈P i (σ ) r j θ i is the total waiting cost of agent i in the queue σ . An allocation is feasible if no two agents are assigned the same position, and the sum of all the transfers is not positive. Thus, the set of feasible allocations
is queue-efficient if it minimizes the total waiting cost among the feasible allocations, that is, for all Smith (1956) , total waiting cost is minimized if the agents are served in nonincreasing order with respect to their urgency index θ i /r i . For i, j ∈ N , if θ i /r i = θ j /r j , then agents i and j have equivalent urgency indexes. The efficient queues do not depend on the transfers. Moreover, it is unique except for agents with equivalent urgency indexes, who will be next to each other in the queue and can be permuted. The set of efficient queues
feasible allocation is efficient if it is queue-efficient and budget balanced.
A rule is a mapping ϕ : S → N ∈N Z (N , r, θ), which associates with each prob- (N , r, θ) represents the position σ i of i in the queue and his transfer t i in (N , r, θ) . If the monetary transfer of an agent is positive, then this agent receives a compensation from other agents. If it is negative, then he/she has to pay that amount as compensation to other agents.
We mention two standard axioms for rules. First, a rule should choose an efficient (i.e. queue-efficient and budget balanced) allocation.
Second, if an allocation is chosen by a rule, then all other allocations which assign the same utility to each agent should be chosen by the rule.
Next we recall two rules studied in Maniquet (2003) and Chun (2006a) for queueing problems, and generalized to sequencing problems by Chun (2011) . The minimal transfer rule selects an efficient queue and transfers from each agent a half of his waiting cost multiplied by the sum of all his predecessors' service times minus a half of the sum of the unit waiting cost over all his/her followers multiplied by his/her own service time.
Minimal transfer rule, ϕ
and
On the other hand, the maximal transfer rule selects an efficient queue and transfers to each agent a half of the sum of the unit waiting cost over all his predecessors multiplied by his/her own service time minus a half of his/her waiting cost multiplied by the sum of each of his followers' service time.
Maximal transfer rule, ϕ X : For all N ∈ N , and all (N , r, θ) ∈ S, N , r, θ) and
Note that the minimal and the maximal transfer rules assign a unique allocation if and only if all agents have different urgency index θ i /r i . However, even when some agents have the same urgency index, agents' utilities do not depend on the choice of efficient queues if the compensation is determined according to the minimal or the maximal transfer rule. Thus, both rules are essentially single-valued, in the sense that for a given problem, each agent's utility is the same at all allocations that the rule chooses. As a consequence, any efficient queue can be chosen to calculate the utilities assigned by the two rules. To be specific, for all N ∈ N , and all (N , r, θ) ∈ S N , for the minimal transfer rule, the utility of agent i is given by
and for the maximal transfer rule,
As mentioned in the introduction, the minimal and the maximal transfer rules can be obtained by applying the Shapley value (1953) to corresponding TU-games in which the worth of a coalition is appropriately defined. For the minimal transfer rule, the worth of a coalition is defined to be the minimum waiting cost incurred by its members under the assumption that they are served before the non-coalitional members. For the maximal transfer rule, it is defined to be the minimum waiting cost incurred by its members under the assumption that they are served after the non-coalitional members.
Balanced consistency in sequencing problems
If an agent leaves a sequencing problem, then it will affect the payoffs of other remaining agents. Balanced consistency requires that the effect of agent i leaving the sequencing problem on the payoff of another agent j = i should be the same as the effect of agent j leaving the sequencing problem on the payoff of agent i. It is similar to 'preservation of differences' of solutions for TU-games as discussed in Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) . 2 To stress the fact that our axiom concerns situations in which an agent leaves the sequencing problem similar as players leave a game in (reduced game) consistency properties, we refer to this property as balanced consistency. 3 For all (N , r, θ) ∈ S N and all j ∈ N , let r − j ∈ IR N \{ j} ++ and θ − j ∈ IR N \{ j} + be the projections given by r − j = (r k ) k∈N \{ j} and θ − j = (θ k ) k∈N \{ j} .
Balanced consistency: For all
Now we investigate the implications of balanced consistency in the context of sequencing problems. First, we show that the minimal transfer rule satisfies the property.
Lemma 1 The minimal transfer rule satisfies balanced consistency.
Proof Let (N , r, θ (N , r, θ) . Let i, j ∈ N be such that j ∈ P i (σ ) (and thus i ∈ F j (σ )). To simplify the notation, we do not attach the superscript M to σ and t. Then, for all
Altogether, we conclude that the minimal transfer rule satisfies balanced consistency.
We ask whether there is any other rule satisfying efficiency and Pareto indifference together with balanced consistency. As it turns out, the minimal transfer rule is the only one satisfying the three axioms together. Before preceding to our first main result, we state the following lemma.
Lemma 2 If a rule ϕ is efficient, then for all (N , r, θ) ∈ S, all (σ, t) ∈ ϕ(N , r, θ), all i ∈ N , and all (σ
Since, by efficiency all agents are served in nonincreasing order with respect to their urgency indices, subtracting these two equations from each other, we obtain (4). Now we are ready to show our first characterization result. We note that if σ i ∈ {1, . . . , |N |} is determined and u i (σ, t) is known, then also t i is determined.
Theorem 1 The minimal transfer rule is the only rule satisfying efficiency, Pareto indifference, and balanced consistency.
Proof It is well known that the minimal transfer rule satisfies efficiency and Pareto indifference, and from Lemma 1, it satisfies balanced consistency. Conversely, let ϕ be a rule satisfying the three axioms. Let N ∈ N and (N , r, θ) ∈ S N be given. If |N | = 1, then efficiency implies that σ i = 1 and t i = 0 for i ∈ N .
Let N be such that |N | = 2. Without loss of generality, we may assume that N ≡ {i, j} and that
. By efficiency and Pareto indifference, we may assume that σ i = 1 and σ j = 2. Then,
We will establish the claim for an arbitrary number of agents by an induction argument. As induction hypothesis, suppose that ϕ (N , r , θ 
. , n}, and let (σ, t) ∈ ϕ(N , r, θ). By efficiency and
Pareto indifference, we may assume without loss of generality that θ 1 /r 1 ≥ θ 2 /r 2 ≥ · · · ≥ θ n /r n , and that
for any i, j ∈ N . Now fix i, change j = i from 1 to n, and add up the (n − 1) equations obtained in this way. We have:
Adding u i (σ, t) + j∈N \{i} u i (σ − j , t − j ) to both sides gives
From the induction hypothesis, it follows that
words, the presence of an agent generates a negative externality to any other agent. Balanced cost reduction requires that the total (over all remaining agents) decrease in this negative externality as a result of the departure of an agent be equal to the negative of the payoff of the departing agent when he is still present.
Balanced cost reduction: For all
We explore the implications of balanced cost reduction in the context of sequencing problems. First, we show that the minimal transfer rule satisfies the property.
Lemma 3 The minimal transfer rule satisfies balanced cost reduction.
Proof Let (N , r, θ) ∈ S and j ∈ N . From the essential single-valuedness of ϕ M , we may choose any (σ, t) ∈ ϕ M (N , r, θ) and any
To simplify the notation, we do not attach the superscript M to σ and t. From (2) and (3) in Lemma 1, we can derive that
showing that the minimal transfer rule satisfies balanced cost reduction.
Next we present our second characterization.
Theorem 2 The minimal transfer rule is the only rule satisfying efficiency, Pareto indifference, and balanced cost reduction.
Proof It is well known that the minimal transfer rule satisfies efficiency and Pareto indifference, and from Lemma 3, it satisfies balanced cost reduction. Conversely, let ϕ be a rule satisfying the three axioms. Let N ∈ N and (N , r, θ) ∈ S N be given. If |N | = 1, then efficiency implies that σ i = 1 and t i = 0 for i ∈ N . Now let N be such that |N | ≥ 2, j ∈ N be a leaving agent, and
Adding u j (σ, t) to both sides gives
Using Lemma 2, and substituting (4) into (8) yields
By efficiency and Pareto indifference, we choose all efficient queues in E f f (N , r, θ), and for any σ ∈ E f f (N , r, θ), (9) fixes the transfers
the desired expression. 4
Concluding remarks
In this article, we presented two axiomatic characterizations of the minimal transfer rule in the context of sequencing problems on the basis of balanced consistency or balanced cost reduction in addition to efficiency and Pareto indifference. We note that all our results carry over to two subclasses of sequencing problems: queueing problems and scheduling problems. Another axiom widely discussed in the literature specifying how a rule should respond to changes in the population is population solidarity (Thomson 1983; Chun 1986 , and others 5 ): it requires that upon the departure of an agent, all the remaining agents should be affected in the same direction, all gain or all lose. As discussed in Chun (2006a) for queueing problems, the minimal transfer rule for sequencing problems also satisfies population solidarity, but the maximal transfer rule does not satisfy it. On the other hand, as in Remark 1, upon the departure of an agent, if we assume that all of his predecessors are moving back by one position to keep the completion time constant, then both the minimal and the maximal transfer rules satisfy the alternative population solidarity under constant completion time property. It remains an open question whether the minimal or the maximal transfer rules can be characterized on the basis of population solidarity.
Another question for future research is to investigate axioms concerning changes in the parameters of the sequencing problem without changing the set of agents, such as the before mentioned balanced contributions property (Myerson 1980) , fairness (Myerson 1977; van den Brink 2001) or monotonicity (Young 1985; van den Brink 2007) .
